<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Swire on Disclosure</title>
	<atom:link href="http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2004/09/swire-on-disclosure.html/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2004/09/swire-on-disclosure.html</link>
	<description>The Emergent Chaos Jazz Combo</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 19:20:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Freedom to Tinker</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2004/09/swire-on-disclosure.html/comment-page-1#comment-26</link>
		<dc:creator>Freedom to Tinker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Sep 2004 11:27:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://emergentchaos.com/?p=32#comment-26</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Security by Obscurity&lt;/strong&gt;

Adam Shostack points to a new paper by Peter Swire, entitled &quot;A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security&quot;. How, Swire asks, can we reconcile the pro-disclosure &quot;no security by obscurity&quot; stance of crypto weenies with the pro-secrecy, &quot;loose lips sink s...
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Security by Obscurity</strong></p>
<p>Adam Shostack points to a new paper by Peter Swire, entitled &#8220;A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security&#8221;. How, Swire asks, can we reconcile the pro-disclosure &#8220;no security by obscurity&#8221; stance of crypto weenies with the pro-secrecy, &#8220;loose lips sink s&#8230;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Peter Swire</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2004/09/swire-on-disclosure.html/comment-page-1#comment-25</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter Swire</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Sep 2004 18:05:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://emergentchaos.com/?p=32#comment-25</guid>
		<description>Adam:  Thanks for the insightful read of the paper.
I agree that it is often hard to estimate &quot;L&quot;, or the amount of learning that attackers get from an attack.  Surveillance seemed the one clear area where the entire game is about the person doing the surveillance keeping sources and methods secret.
On the Capital Markets point, you seem to be saying that sufficient (satisficing) data is all that the hacker needs, because the hacker can take it from there (especially with multiple attacks until something works).  In the stock market, optimal data is needed to beat the market.  To the extent you are correct about the usefulness of satisficing data, then the set of attackers will be closer to efficiency.  That is, less reason not to disclose.
peter
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Adam:  Thanks for the insightful read of the paper.<br />
I agree that it is often hard to estimate &#8220;L&#8221;, or the amount of learning that attackers get from an attack.  Surveillance seemed the one clear area where the entire game is about the person doing the surveillance keeping sources and methods secret.<br />
On the Capital Markets point, you seem to be saying that sufficient (satisficing) data is all that the hacker needs, because the hacker can take it from there (especially with multiple attacks until something works).  In the stock market, optimal data is needed to beat the market.  To the extent you are correct about the usefulness of satisficing data, then the set of attackers will be closer to efficiency.  That is, less reason not to disclose.<br />
peter</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

