A historian, Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III, Ph.D, gave a talk a few months ago at Cornell, entitled “Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq.” His basic thesis seems to be that, in contrast to a carefully planned and executed war campaign, there were no definitive plans for what to do after the Iraqi army collapsed. “In short, there was no operational plan for the post-offensive because the postoffensive phases were viewed as someone else’s mission” is how he summarizes his thesis. This is all made more interesting because he’s not some bleeding-heart peacenik, but a Major in the US Army:
From April to June 2003, this author chronicled the war effort as a researcher and a primary writer for the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA’s) Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Study Group. This assignment offered great opportunity to view the execution of combat operations from a frontline vantage point, to conduct formal interviews with soldiers of every ground unit (US Army, US Marine Corps, and UK Forces) engaged in the march up country to Baghdad and record their experiences and lessons gathered. From July 2003 to March 2004, this author participated more intimately in the war effort, serving as the chief of plans (chief war planner) for the 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault). In this capacity, this author participated in and led the planning of combat (offense; csupport, and civil reconstruction efforts in northern Iraq.
He characterizes the state of affairs on the ground today:
The lack of an endstate-driven campaign plan prior to the commitment of combat forces in Iraq has contributed to the present state of civil-military affairs in Iraq: a Coalition Provisional Authority (and now a “sovereign” interim Iraqi government) lacking long-range vision and the know-how to put into action those goals and objectives its has figured out thus far, and a combined and joint military force with the expertise in getting things done – be it destruction or reconstruction – yet hobbled by a lack of resources, a lack of a winning plan and strategy, and an over-abundance of misdirected bureaucratic “assistance.”
His report is in two major parts, the pre-war planning, and the experience of the 101st Airborne division in Northern Iraq. That Northern Iraq hasn’t fallen into disarray is actually impressive: The Kurds would like nothing more than to secede and start their own country. There’s a substantial Baathist regision. Turkish special forces were scattered throughout. He explains why, and proposes ways to improve things, both in the rest of the country, and in US military doctrine and training.
I feel a little bad in that he asks we not cite his work without permission. But these are important policy questions, and the document was on a public web site. The entire report is worth reading if you care about why we are where we are.
Now all of this was drawn to my attention by an article in the Washington Post, Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan:
Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, who as chief of the Central Command led the war planning in 2002 and 2003, states in his recent memoir, “American Soldier,” that throughout the planning for the invasion of Iraq, Phase IV stability operations were discussed. Occupation problems “commanded hours and days of discussion and debate among CENTCOM planners and Washington officials,” he adds. At another point, he states, “I was confident in the Phase IV plan.”
A rank amateur in the art of reading statements written by media consultants would think that the Major and the General are contradicting each other. But they’re not. Wilson argues that the planning was insufficient, chaotic, and missed important factors for organizational reasons. Of course Franks, as a participant in the system, didn’t see these flaws at the time. Of course he was confident: If he wasn’t, the plans would be revised until he was. But were the plans critiqued, and did those critiques reach his ears? Wilson says no.
[Update: James Fallows has a long piece in the Altantic on the war, and post-war planning process.]