Comments on: Why Not Accept Random Searches?

By: Tech Policy

Tech Policy — Thu, 28 Jul 2005 14:03:08 +0000

Random Subway Searches in NYC

Bill West on The Counterterrorism Blog explains why random subway searches are a bad idea, if not downright stupid.The likes of me, a 29-year law enforcement veteran who spent half his career working organized crime and national security cases, has fou…

By: Chris Beck

Chris Beck — Thu, 28 Jul 2005 00:29:04 +0000

Here is why it is a bad thing:
It won’t work. It is intrusive.
So if you really want to sooth people’s feelings, perhaps you could do it by choosing something that works and isn’t intrusive.
To say “well, it might make people feel better and it isn’t really all that much liberty” is to miss the point of liberty in the American system. Liberties are not granted to citizens, they pre-exist governement and therefore any governmental intrusion *must be justified*.
Ineffective sops are not justification.
I think Ben Franklin said it best:
“They who would give up an essential liberty for temporary security, deserve neither”

By: Jamie

Jamie — Wed, 27 Jul 2005 19:27:20 +0000

But from “a specific situation in a specific place” to “constantly” it doesn’t progress so fast in my mind, that’s what I don’t think I really understand.
Look to London. Cameras are everywhere. There are very few public places where one isn’t watched. Add “random” searches as transport hubs, things like EZ pass here in the States (don’t know if they use something similar in London or not), and you have a surveillance platform the Stasi would have drooled over.
And now, a heavier police presence and searches could cause the potential terrorist to revise their plans?
I don’t see why they would; the chances of being caught are near zero, and in any case we (I live in Brooklyn) are free to walk away without being searched, so the cost is zero. Why would this effect a terrorist plot?
But, Arguendo, let’s grant that it did increase the costs of bombing the subway. Were I a bomber (what bombs at midnight?), I’d hit somewhere else. Now, the random search proponents are tasked with implementing the searchs everywhere, or at least every high value target, for values of ‘high’ that determined bombers could chase down arbitrarily low. This is far, far worse than pushing on a waterbed – now you’ve given the attackers the ability to direct law enforcement efforts away from other activities to violating the 4th amendment.
Of course, I don’t think it would go that far, but it does illustrate the sillyness of the whole thing.
So, perhaps they can’t prevent the attack that didn’t happen last year, but personally I believe that smart use of resources like searches can prevent the one that might be any day now.
That’s just it, though: the NY searches aren’t a smart use of resources. As Bruce says, it is pure security theater: searchers spend time reducing the chance of someone slipping in to the subway with a bomb by a very, very small amount, there’s no repercussion for trying it, and it wastes the time of the people being searched and violates the spirit, even if not the letter, of the 4th amendment. Where’s the win?
I don’t know. How is this different from airport x-ray machines ?
- It is orders of magnitude less effective (and airport measures are pretty bad, too).
- It intrudes far more on the daily, quotidian life of everyone, and trains the citizens to behave like sheep
- The MTA is state owned, rather than privately owned like airlines and most airports (although I admit this is becoming a distinction without a difference), triggering different legal issues
- It diverts LEA resources from things they could be doing that have the possibility of actually reducing risk.
I like the idea of a totalitarian state machine, evn if most of us call that a “brick”…

By: Adam

Adam — Wed, 27 Jul 2005 17:15:29 +0000

Thanks, Zooko, I just realized that I’d forgotten to fix that. (I couldn’t recall if it was Steve or Dave, because I’ve worked with a Dave Mann.)

By: Zooko

Zooko — Wed, 27 Jul 2005 17:08:18 +0000

Steve Mann

By: Izar

Izar — Wed, 27 Jul 2005 15:01:42 +0000

First of all, thanks for taking the time to answer my question. As always, your opinion on these matters give me stuff to think about.
I think I understand what you meant to say, but I cannot totally agree. Of course, giving up one liberty in the form of random search in a specific situation in a specific place is one step towards eroding freedom as a value. I agree to that. I can see the spiritual and societal hit when people are watched constantly. But from “a specific situation in a specific place” to “constantly” it doesn’t progress so fast in my mind, that’s what I don’t think I really understand. How from a preventive measure that, really, is there as much to calm the regular citizen (“See?The police are doing what they can!They’re trying!”) as anything, we get to a Big Brother society. Yes, there is the salami theory, a slice here and then a slice more, but where is the break between what is actually advisable or necessary or just plain doable and the total assault on our liberty and freedom? Where is the individual willing to sacrifice some freedom in order to improve the collective ?
I can’t but question your argument that since the number of train bombings in the last year was zero, then it is not cost-effective to use that specific measure to try and protect them (if I understand you correctly). Before the 70s, no airline hijacks. During the 70s, you went into a plane and you got a little dictionary of the most popular sentences in Cuba and Algeria. Terrorism seems to have this “fad” thing, where one thing that’s shown to work keeps being tried until the next thing comes by.
You point that “had you searched every single bag of every rider of every metro system in the United States last year, you would have found exactly no bombs”. Perhaps there was a dry run and a potential terrorist got scared seeing some police presence in the subway? And now, a heavier police presence and searches could cause the potential terrorist to revise their plans? Since Tokyo and then London,subways are targets. After Tokyo I’d have agreed with you.Aum Shinrikyo wasn’t just going to try and do the same with NYC. But after London ?
I’ve heard security people talk about their jobs. The consensus seemed to be that a good day was one when nothing happened. A great day was when something was actually prevented. There were some amazing days when things were very succesful, and of those we will never hear details. That, in my opinion, is most unfortunate, because from a marketing perspective, if you don’t advertise your successes, you don’t get funding/support. But for these people, the fact that a day follows another and people can go to work and back home and have fun in the weekend means a job well done.
So, perhaps they can’t prevent the attack that didn’t happen last year, but personally I believe that smart use of resources like searches can prevent the one that might be any day now.
I would agree with the costs and limits you mention, if we were talking about police (pa)trolling the streets and stopping and searching people “just because”, at any time and place, with no regards for their rights. But if limits and boundaries can be imposed on the search… I don’t know. How is this different from airport x-ray machines ?
Come to think of it, what happens in Israel if you go into a shopping center and they find drugs in your bag ? I have no idea. Most of the checking is done by civilian security companies, and they’d have no authority to do anything, I _think_. Even most government places I remember going into had civilians doing the checking. Does that make the intrusion any better in some sense ?
p.s – A Totalitarian State Machine is a finite state machine that doesn’t change states, in fact you will be taken out and shot if you dare to speak about changing states or changing anything about the State ;)