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	<title>Comments on: Do Kings Play Chess on Folding Glass Stools?</title>
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	<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2006/10/do-kings-play-chess-on-folding-glass-stools.html</link>
	<description>The Emergent Chaos Jazz Combo</description>
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		<title>By: SteveChristey</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2006/10/do-kings-play-chess-on-folding-glass-stools.html/comment-page-1#comment-2743</link>
		<dc:creator>SteveChristey</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Oct 2006 19:45:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://emergentchaos.com/?p=2005#comment-2743</guid>
		<description>Having thought quite a bit about taxonomies as part of the CWE project and general CVE-ness, I think one of the biggest challenges for vulnerability classification is that most vulns are not &#039;atomic&#039;.  Think of symlink issues, which combine randomness, race conditions (sometimes), permissions, and non-atomic actions (making a temp file in 2 steps instead of one), not to mention API/design limitations that make symlink issues possible in the first place.  Or directory traversal which, if you get beyond just &quot;..&quot;, brings in elements of canonicalization or order-of-operations.  You could also argue that what I&#039;m talking about are attacks instead of vulns.  For many issues, there can be several sequences of actions and conditions that, when combined, form a vuln.  In some ways integer overflows are related to buffer overflows, but only if they occur in parts of the code that deal with copying data; there&#039;s no reason why an integer overflow can&#039;t be part of a numeric comparison that decides whether someone should get special privileges.  And then think about the fact that if an integer overflow occurs, *a mistake was already made* somewhere earlier.  And, XSS and exploitable buffer overflows both share the property of mixing data and code.  Now maybe we just haven&#039;t identified the correct properties to form the ideal taxonomy for uniquely identifying vulns, and I have some emerging thoughts on that, but I think we still have a good way to go.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having thought quite a bit about taxonomies as part of the CWE project and general CVE-ness, I think one of the biggest challenges for vulnerability classification is that most vulns are not &#8216;atomic&#8217;.  Think of symlink issues, which combine randomness, race conditions (sometimes), permissions, and non-atomic actions (making a temp file in 2 steps instead of one), not to mention API/design limitations that make symlink issues possible in the first place.  Or directory traversal which, if you get beyond just &#8220;..&#8221;, brings in elements of canonicalization or order-of-operations.  You could also argue that what I&#8217;m talking about are attacks instead of vulns.  For many issues, there can be several sequences of actions and conditions that, when combined, form a vuln.  In some ways integer overflows are related to buffer overflows, but only if they occur in parts of the code that deal with copying data; there&#8217;s no reason why an integer overflow can&#8217;t be part of a numeric comparison that decides whether someone should get special privileges.  And then think about the fact that if an integer overflow occurs, *a mistake was already made* somewhere earlier.  And, XSS and exploitable buffer overflows both share the property of mixing data and code.  Now maybe we just haven&#8217;t identified the correct properties to form the ideal taxonomy for uniquely identifying vulns, and I have some emerging thoughts on that, but I think we still have a good way to go.</p>
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		<title>By: Iang</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2006/10/do-kings-play-chess-on-folding-glass-stools.html/comment-page-1#comment-2742</link>
		<dc:creator>Iang</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Oct 2006 15:24:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://emergentchaos.com/?p=2005#comment-2742</guid>
		<description>for some reason ... I am reminded of today&#039;s post from &#039;Cubicle:
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;i&gt;Security is like an analogy. It only works up until the point that someone considers an angle or aspect that you haven’t previously considered and accounted for.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;http://thurston.halfcat.org/blog/2006/10/11/the-last-security-analogy-youll-ever-need&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Not Bad for a Cubicle :-)&lt;/a&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>for some reason &#8230; I am reminded of today&#8217;s post from &#8216;Cubicle:</p>
<blockquote><p><i>Security is like an analogy. It only works up until the point that someone considers an angle or aspect that you haven’t previously considered and accounted for.</i></p></blockquote>
<p><a href="http://thurston.halfcat.org/blog/2006/10/11/the-last-security-analogy-youll-ever-need" rel="nofollow">Not Bad for a Cubicle :-)</a></p>
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