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	<title>Comments on: Risk Managers Are Just Like Security People</title>
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	<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2008/09/risk-managers-are-just-like-security-people.html</link>
	<description>The Emergent Chaos Jazz Combo</description>
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		<title>By: Davi Ottenheimer</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2008/09/risk-managers-are-just-like-security-people.html/comment-page-1#comment-5020</link>
		<dc:creator>Davi Ottenheimer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 01:58:39 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>yes, the basel ii accord is a good example of how information technology, financial and operational risk can be related to each other and managed together.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>yes, the basel ii accord is a good example of how information technology, financial and operational risk can be related to each other and managed together.</p>
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		<title>By: Rick</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2008/09/risk-managers-are-just-like-security-people.html/comment-page-1#comment-5019</link>
		<dc:creator>Rick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 23:59:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>There is no surprise in this comment. And in fact, I become more inclined to the idea that Information security is part of the operational risk domain and thus a lot of similarities.
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is no surprise in this comment. And in fact, I become more inclined to the idea that Information security is part of the operational risk domain and thus a lot of similarities.</p>
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		<title>By: Alex</title>
		<link>http://emergentchaos.com/archives/2008/09/risk-managers-are-just-like-security-people.html/comment-page-1#comment-5018</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2008 15:12:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I&#039;m often thinking that economics suffers mainly because the scientific method they apply to their models has more immediate societal &quot;risk&quot; associated with them being wrong than, say, a theory on the extinction of dinosaurs or obscure models built around Phosphorus 31 NMR spectral properties. (see the overcomingbias.com article by Hanson about &#039;hate&#039; and economists).
My current line of thought is that &quot;Security&quot; (or Information Risk Management if you&#039;re so inclined) suffers similarly because of the perceived probable impact - not only in *not* addressing the risk because of unplanned cost increases, but just the act of addressing the risk is personally painful.  This is an organizational behavior problem, and that&#039;s a discipline that we&#039;re just not that good at yet (possibly because we&#039;ve dons so poorly on the risk thing).
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m often thinking that economics suffers mainly because the scientific method they apply to their models has more immediate societal &#8220;risk&#8221; associated with them being wrong than, say, a theory on the extinction of dinosaurs or obscure models built around Phosphorus 31 NMR spectral properties. (see the overcomingbias.com article by Hanson about &#8216;hate&#8217; and economists).<br />
My current line of thought is that &#8220;Security&#8221; (or Information Risk Management if you&#8217;re so inclined) suffers similarly because of the perceived probable impact &#8211; not only in *not* addressing the risk because of unplanned cost increases, but just the act of addressing the risk is personally painful.  This is an organizational behavior problem, and that&#8217;s a discipline that we&#8217;re just not that good at yet (possibly because we&#8217;ve dons so poorly on the risk thing).</p>
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