Adam’s new startup

A conversation with an old friend reminded me that there may be folks who follow this blog, but not the New School blog.

Over there, I’ve posted “Improving Security Effectiveness” about leaving Microsoft to work on my new company:

For the last few months, I’ve been working full time and talking with colleagues about a new way for security executives to measure the effectiveness of security programs. In very important ways, the ideas are new and non-obvious, and at the same time, they’re an evolution of the ideas that Andrew and I wrote about in the New School book that inspired this blog.

and about a job opening, “Seeking a technical leader for my new company:”

We have a new way to measure security effectiveness, and want someone who’ll drive to delivering the technology to customers, while building a great place for developers to ship and deploy important technology. We are very early in the building of the company. The right person will understand such a “green field” represents both opportunity and that we’ll have to build infrastructure as we grow.

This person might be a CTO, they might be a Chief Architect. They are certainly an experienced leader with strong references from peers, management and reports.

What Happened At OPM?

I want to discuss some elements of the OPM breach and what we know and what we don’t. Before I do, I want to acknowledge the tremendous and justified distress that those who’ve filled out the SF-86 form are experiencing. I also want to acknowledge the tremendous concern that those who employ those with clearances must be feeling. The form is designed as an (inverted) roadmap to suborning people, and now all that data is in the hands of a foreign intelligence service.

The National Journal published A Timeline of Government Data Breaches:
OPM Data Breach

I asked after the root cause, and Rich Bejtlich responded “The root cause is a focus on locking doors and windows while intruders are still in the house” with a pointer to his “Continuous Diagnostic Monitoring Does Not Detect Hackers.”

And while I agree with Richard’s point in that post, I don’t think that’s the root cause. When I think about root cause, I think about approaches like Five Whys or Ishikawa. If we apply this sort of approach then we can ask, “Why were foreigners able to download the OPM database?” There are numerous paths that we might take, for example:

  1. Because of a lack of two-factor authentication (2FA)
  2. Why? Because some critical systems at OPM don’t support 2FA.
  3. Why? Because of a lack of budget for upgrades & testing (etc)

Alternately, we might go down a variety of paths based on the Inspector General Report. We might consider Richard’s point:

  1. A focus on locking doors and windows while intruders are still in the house.
  2. Why? Because someone there knows how to lock doors and windows.
  3. Why? Because lots of organizations hire out of government agencies.
  4. Why? Because they pay better
  5. [Alternate] Employees don’t like the clearance process

But we can go down alternate paths:

  1. A focus on locking doors and windows while intruders are still in the house.
  2. Why? Because finding intruders in the house is hard, and people often miss those stealthy attackers.
  3. Why? Because networks are chaotic and change frequently
  4. [Alternate] Because not enough people publish lists of IoCs, so defenders don’t know what to look for.

What I’d really like to see are specific technical facts laid out. (Or heck, if the facts are unknowable because logs rotated or attackers deleted them, or we don’t even know why we can’t know, let’s talk about that, and learn from it.)

OPM and Katherine Archuleta have already been penalized. Let’s learn things beyond dates. Let’s put the facts out there, or, as I quoted in my last post we “should declare the causes which impel them to the separation”, or “let Facts be submitted to a candid world.” Once we have facts about the causes, we can perform deeper root cause analysis.

I don’t think that the OIG report contains those causes. Each of those audit failings might play one of several roles. The failing might have been causal, and fixing it would have stopped the attack. The failing might have been casual and the attacker would have worked around it. The failing might be irrelevant (for example, I’ve rarely seen an authorization to operate prevent an attack, unless you fold it up very small and glue it into a USB port). The failings might even have been distracting, taking attention away from other work that might have prevented the attack.

A collection of public facts would enable us to have a discussion about those possibilities. We could have a meta-conversation about those categorizations of failings, and if there’s other ones which make more sense.

Alternately, we can keep going the way we’re going.

So. What happened at OPM?

An Infosec lesson from the “Worst Play Call Ever”

It didn’t take long for the Seahawk’s game-losing pass to get a label.

But as Ed Felten explains, there’s actually some logic to it, and one of his commenters (Chris) points out that Marshawn Lynch scored in only one of his 5 runs from the one yard line this season. So, perhaps in a game in which the Patriots had no interceptions, it was worth the extra play before the clock ran out.

We can all see the outcome, and we judge, post-facto, the decision on that.

Worst play call ever

In security, we almost never see an outcome so closely tied to a decision. As Jay Jacobs has pointed out, we live in a wicked environment. Unfortunately, we’re quick to snap to judgement when we see a bad outcome. That makes learning harder. Also, we don’t usually get a chance to see the logic behind a play and assess it.

If only we had a way to shorten those feedback loops, then maybe we could assess what the worst play call in infosec might be.

And in fact, despite my use of snarky linkage, I don’t think we know enough to judge Sony or ChoicePoint. The decisions made by Spaltro at Sony are not unusual. We hear them all the time in security. The outcome at Sony is highly visible, but is it the norm, or is it an outlier? I don’t think we know enough to know the answer.

Hindsight is 20/20 in football. It’s easy to focus in on a single decision. But the lesson from Moneyball, and the lesson from Pete Carroll is Really, with no second thoughts or hesitation in that at all.” He has a system, and it got the Seahawks to the very final seconds of the game. And then.

One day, we’ll be able to tell management “our systems worked, and we hit really bad luck.”

[Please keep comments civil, like you always do here.]