The Presentation of Self in Everyday Tweeting

Chris Hoff pointed to an interesting blog post from Peter Shankman. Someone* tweeted “True confession but I’m in one of those towns where I scratch my head and say ‘I would die if I had to live here!’”

Well it turns out that…

Not only did an employee find it, they were totally offended by it and responded to the agency person. The kicker is that they copied the FedEx Coporate Vice President, Vice President, Directors and all management of FedEx’s communication department AND the chain of command at (his employer).

Now, the twit who tweeted was clearly a twit, having mixed business and personal in a way that offended a major client. But let’s step back.

First, it’s important to remember that we all have personal lives, and it’s a good thing to be able to separate them from our work lives. If you work in IT and want to blog about gardening, no one is going to confuse things. Where it gets a little grey is when we’re deeply enthused about our work. I blog under my real name about topics that impact my employer. Not all–there are posts that haven’t seen the light of day because they’re too close. Sometimes, I cover work here when I’m really excited about it. My co-workers at Microsoft and my colleagues at Waggener Edstrom also understand that Emergent Chaos is separate, and have never asked me to post anything here.

Second, I think it’s important to generate a zone of professionalism where we it is seen as reasonable for seasoned professionals to comment on things which impact their employers without a presumption that they speak for their employer. This is not without challenges. If we’re naive about it, we create a zone of shills where people are paid to speak for their employers, and lie. At the same time, there are people with a degree of experience, maturity, and wisdom where you want them to be free to speak. Similarly, Microsoft’s willingness to accept my continued posting here without a lot of oversight made me happier in accepting their job. There are lots of companies which would have said “no way.”

Third, I think you need to telegraph where difference is. Here, it’s very clear that we speak for the President of the United States, not our employers. When I mention Microsoft, I try to be clear, although in reviewing posts, I seem to have fallen down a little. A post like “SDL Announcements” is pretty clearly me speaking about work:

I’m in Barcelona, where my employer has made three announcements about our Security Development Lifecycle, which you can read about here…I’m most excited about the public availability of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool. I’ve been working on this for the last 18 months…

(Speaking of clear, not all of the posts in the category are by me.)

The title is of course, a reference to the classic work of sociology, in which Goffman explains that we all present different facets of ourselves in different contexts. In blurring these contexts, services like Twitter and Facebook present a serious challenge to how we conceptualize and present ourselves.

Chaos in the Airports! Baa! Baa!

TSA Badges.jpg
Some days the snark just writes itself:

The group that created Smokey Bear and McGruff the Crime Dog has a new potential icon: Stephanie the airport screener.

A $1.3 million ad campaign launched this month teams the Ad Council and the Transportation Security Administration trying to change behavior of passengers who no longer automatically accept post-Sept. 11 airport security procedures. The public relations push explains the terrorist threat and the reasons behind annoyances at checkpoints.

A passenger focus group conducted for TSA by New York City business consulting firm Blue Lime found that “unquestioning compliance has diminished.” Passengers say they are more afraid of missing their flight than they are of an airplane being attacked, the 73-page Blue Lime report found. (“TSA ads aim to get fliers on board with security measures,” USA Today)

Stephanie Naar has been in the news before, as part of the TSA’s wasting our money on jackboots badges. Not sure (yet) if the image is her. I’ll snap a pic if I see the ad.

PS to TSA: there’s a good reason McGruff and Smokey were animated.

Photo by Paul J. Richards / AFP / Getty. Races purely coincidental.

Public Policy and InfoSec

…Armed with my favorite govie (who is actually the lead on this, I’m just a straphanger), The New School of Information Security (Hi Adam and Andrew), some government policy directives, and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, I am teaching an Information Security Management and Public Policy class for Carnegie Mellon’s Heinz School.

The more I work with the Masters of Science in Public Policy Management program, the more I’m sold on it. Basically the students do a year on-campus in Pittsburg, then they have the option of staying there or coming to DC. The students who come to DC work a 32-hour week (some do more), 2 night classes, and class for most of Friday. Our information security class fits in as a sector-specific deep-dive, the other one being healthcare (which needs smart public policy people, too).

Which is where we need some help. It’s a little behind the game, but we’re constantly looking for Government agencies, NGOs/NPOs, and contractors who are interested in taking on interns. Even better if you have jobs that don’t have a US citizenship requirement. If you want to be linked up, just drop me a line.

First, thank you! Andrew and I are both tremendously excited to see the New School being used at CMU. If anyone knows of internships to help their students find jobs, please visit “The Guerilla CISO” and let’s help them out?

Confirmation Bias and Newspaper Endorsements

We’ve been talking a lot lately about confirmation bias. It turns out that newspaper endorsements are more influential when they are unexpected.

The degree of this influence, however, depends upon the credibility of the endorsement. In this way, endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less influential than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning newspapers…

Via the Economist Free Exchange blog, after the newspaper credibly endorsed Obama.

Previously on confirmation bias: “Things only an astrologist could believe,” “No evidence the data was misused,” and “More on confirmation bias.”

Thoughts about Democracy in America

There’s a place in de Tocqueville where he talks about America’s civic strength coming from the way we organize: those voluntary organizations which come together to solve a problem as a community. He pointed out that what we got from that was not merely that particular problem solved, but a sense of community and a willingness to solve problems without the heavy hand of government.

I am tremendously inspired by stories like “Daughter of slave votes for Obama.” There’s real progress for our country, within the course of a lifetime.

I’ve watched as a number of my friends have gone all out for Obama, some traveling on their own dime to knock on doors in states less blue than their own. I’m glad to see that level of enthusiasm: a politics of petty attacks is very likely to lose tomorrow, where a McCain who had been “the McCain of 2000″ might well have won.

I worry about Obama’s views on national service, including his goal of 50 hours of community service from every middle and high school student, and his goal of federalizing non-profits. I think that the value of non-profits comes from their volunteer nature, and from their diverse goals. Federal dollars will be alluring for their sheer scale. They will also be distracting for many non-profits, forced, like many churches to strangely bifurcate their activity to allow for federal dollars to flow in. As de Tocqueville understood, much of the value of volunteerism — including volunteering for a political candidate — is that it brings us together as a civic society.

As I watch the outpouring of enthusiasm and of hope, I am hopeful that Obama is smart enough to understand that the real strength of our nation is not in Washington, and it’s not in directives from Washington. It’s from hundreds of millions of people pursuing their hopes and dreams. America is a diverse set of people with different hopes and different dreams, and the value of our democracy is that is has embraced and promoted the freedom of each of us to pursue our own dreams, chaotic though that may be.

CTOs, Product Management and Program Management

In “The product manager’s lament,” Eric Ries writes about his view of product managers:

Let’s start with what the product manager does. He’s supposed to be the person who specifies what the product will do. He writes detailed specs which lay out exactly what features the team should build in its next iteration. These specs are handed to a designer, who builds layouts and mockups of all the salient points. Then the designs are handed to a team of programmers with various specialties.

When I met this team, some acrimony had built up. The last few features came out pretty different from what was origianlly spec’d, and took far too long, to boot. The programmers keep asking for more say in the designs and direction that they work on.

I think Eric is almost right about what a product manager should do. I want to provide two disparate perspectives on what that almost entails, and why it’s important. First, I’d like to talk about the role of the program manager at Microsoft (my current day job) and then about the role of the startup CTO (my previous day job).

The program manager’s job is to understand the market and customer pain, shape consensus around what a solution looks like, spec that solution, then drive implementation and the inevitable tradeoffs and ship a solution which makes customers happy.* I do all of that in creating the SDL threat modeling tool.

Some people think the market approach is strange because inside Microsoft, the SDL requires threat modeling. But most markets are distorted in some way by legal requirements. I treat threat modeling as a market with pain that I need to address, and do my best to win in that market. I’m fairly pedantic about talking about our customers, rather than our users, because we give them better tools, and make them more successful when we treat them as valued customers.

Note that that is a super-set of Eric’s description of what a product manager does. He has some interesting suggestions, but the real fix is to get the guy who owns the spec deeply involved in the software process, from start to finish. Which brings me to the role of the CTO.

The role of a good CTO is to understand the market and customer pain, shape consensus around what a solution looks like, spec that solution, then drive implementation and the inevitable tradeoffs and ship a solution which makes customers happy. There’s also a responsibility to be a company leader, hiring, shaping the culture, and participating in the executive decisions the company makes. Sometimes, there’s a need to step in and build. But a large part of the CTO role is that of the program manager. I think this is why I’m able to succeed as a program manager—I’ve been at it for a while.

In Eric’s post last month, “What does a startup CTO actually do?,” he provided a different list: platform selection and technical design; seeing the big picture; providing options; finding the 80/20 and growing technical leaders. I think that’s a good list, but it’s missing a key piece, which is the vision to bits to customer experience scope that is at the core of the program management mindset.

[Update: The * was going to be a footnote citing an internal doc which I'm paraphrasing, but I decided to cut it, and forgot to remove the *. Oops!]

Discipline and Art

Stephan Bugaj has a fascinating article up, “Steve Kurtz: Tactical Art.” I wanted to tie this to my post “The Discipline of ‘think like an attacker’

Kurtz only briefly mentioned his four year ordeal with the Department of Justice (this is also a good article about it), and only as a single exemplar of his overall thesis that the role of art is to push back against the social mechanisms of what he’s termed “expression management.”

In staging this mock bioweapon release in front of the U.S. Embassy, what Kurtz found was that his own internal microfascisms were causing him to attempt to derail his own project by listing things he was sure they wouldn’t be allowed to do: march and then assemble in front of the embassy, then use a city tower to release the smoke with the (harmless) biological sample in it, and then bring skin samples from the participants to a lab for testing.

What he found instead was that the Leipzigers, despite Germany’s decades longer ordeal with terrorism (from not just Islamists, but also neo-Nazis and Communists), were quite willing to support the project. When the sponsoring Leipzig arts institution asked, the city gave them use of the tower, and permission to march to and in-front of the embassy, with no fuss. The biological laboratory in the city was equally obliging.

It’s a very interesting post about the intersection of art with ‘the policeman within.’ The lecturer in question has certainly had enough encounters with the policemen to have developed an interesting orientation towards their relationship with society.

In security engineering work, we often have to overcome internal filters, such as “why would anyone do that?” I think that powerful art, like that of Banksy or Wendy Richmond has an ability to transform the way we see the world for the better. It’s a shame when our artists need to contend with arrest for doing things which are not illegal, but merely confusing to our armed public servants.

Previously on Emergent Chaos: Banksy on anonymity, England, and Disneyland.

The Costs of Secrecy

Security continues to be crippled by a conspiracy of silence. The ongoing costs of not talking about what’s going wrong are absolutely huge, and today, we got insight into just how huge.


Richard Clayton and Tyler Moore of Cambridge University have a new paper on phishing, “The consequence of non-cooperation in the fight against phishing.” In it, they look at how phishing sites are taken down, and estimate how much faster it would be if there were better sharing of data. From their blogpost:

Since extended lifetimes equate to more unsuspecting visitors handing over their credentials and having their bank accounts cleaned out, these delays can also be expressed in monetary terms. Using the rough and ready model we developed last year, we estimate that an extra $326 million per annum is currently being put at risk by the lack of data sharing. This figure is from our analysis of just two companies’ feeds, and there are several more such companies in this business.

I haven’t had time to read the paper in depth, but I have a lot of respect for both Richard and Tyler. Have you read the paper? Impressions? (Here or on their blog.)

Security is an Empirical and Social Science

In reading Mordaxus’ post “Quantum Crypto Broken Again,” I was struck by his comment:

It is a serious flaw because one of the main arguments about quantum cryptography is that because it is “physics” based as opposed to “computer” based, that it is more secure than software cryptography.”

Firstly, security is almost always an outcome of the combination of science, engineering and the socio-legal context in which the engineering is deployed. Let’s assume that the science and engineering on the SUX-8000 Quantum Key Distributor are perfect, and the SUX has t three lights: power, carrier and tampering. When the tampering light starts blinking, one of two things can happen. First, Alice will continue to use the bits, because her operations manual doesn’t say what to do. Alternately, she’ll call Bob and say “Hey Bob, is your SUX blinking red?” At this point, we’re out of the realm of unobservable spin (or perhaps not–quantum crypto does seem to involve a tremendous of spin which is hard to interact with). But then we’re out of the realm of particle spins and into the realm of human activity which gives meaning and relevance to the physics.

I’m not going to delve into the physics of it. I know enough to know that I don’t play there. But I can listen and understand people who play at the engineering level. There are issues with the orientation or changes in orientation of the mirrors, or with bursts of unexpected photons down the fiber, and these lead to a whole slew of attack vectors which may or may not be practical. The quantum cryptographers call these cheating. I call them security engineering.

Finally, on the socio-legal level, what action Alice and Bob take is first determined by their personal relationship. If they’re husband and wife, they might have some spare bits available from last time they were in the same place. If they’re co-workers, perhaps they have a boss who can help them get secure bits. But maybe Alice works at a stock exchange, and Bob at a bank. There might be some urgency, and there might also be economic or legal consequences to shutting down the communication lines.

This is one of the key points Andrew and I made in the New School: that the technology is embedded in a human context, and we need to examine it as such. That idea is embodied in a paper by my friends Sarah Blankinship, Tomasz Ostwald and Jon Pincus, “Computer Science is a Social Science.” (Link points to a draft, a fuller version is forthcoming.)

Claims that a technology is secure absent the social and legal contexts which give security meaning are no longer just irksome: they actively detract from progress in the field.